Understanding of signature errors der Non Canonica in Bitcoin transactions
When it comes to performing bitcoin transactions, safety is essential. One of the most crucial aspects of guaranteeing safe execution is the management of digital signatures, in particular the non -canonical derivation scheme (NCD) used by Bitcoin. In this article, we will deepen the world of non -canonical derivatives and how they can lead to signature errors in certain transaction scenarios.
** What are the signatures not channels?
In the Bitcoin blockchain, a transaction is composed or more components, including input, outputs, commissions and digital signatures. The signature is generated using the digital signature algorithm of the elliptical curve (ECDSA) with SHA-256 as Digest Message algorithm. However, the NCD is used to derive signatures for specific output values without actually generating a complete Ecdsa signature.
In a standard multi-sig transaction, two parts agree on the results they will receive. The public key of the first part generates the inputs, while their private key is used to sign the transaction. The public key of the second part signs the transaction and then performed by miners to produce output values.
The problem: signature errors der non canonical
Now, let's consider an edge case in which two transactions produce the same hash but have different outputs due to NCD errors. In this scenario, the first transaction (TX 1) has a specific non -canonical derivative signature error, while the second transaction (TX 2) Onsn.
** Why does it matter?
If the signature of TX 1 is not canonical, it means that the private key of the second part used to sign TX 2 has been compromised. Although the two transactions produce the same hash, the differentiation output values are due to this NCD error, which could have serious safety implications.
Example code: Understanding of the derivation
To illustrate how it works, we consider a simplified example using the Libecc bookshop of Bitcoin:
`C
#include
// Define the Ecdsa parameters
Count Ec_key Ec_key = Ec_Key_New_from_file ("Private_key.pem");
EC_PUBKEY PUBKEKE1 = EC_KEY_TO_PUBKEY (EC_KEY);
EC_PUBKEY PUBKEKE2 = EC_KEY_TO_PUBKEY (EC_KEY);
Int Main () {
// Signature TX 1 with Pubkey1
Ec_signatures *SIG1 = EC_SIGN (0, Ec_key, "Tx1_data", null);
// Deriva signature for TX 2 using NCD
Int ncd_error = -1; // assume the error code
Ec_pubkeke derid_pubkey;
IF (Ec_derive (NCD_error, Pubkey2, & DITED_PUBKEY)) {
PRINTF ("Public key derivative: %s \ n", Deried_pubkey.to_string (). C_str ());
Return 0;
}
// Signature TX 2 with derivative key-key
Ec_signatures *SIG2 = EC_SIGN (1, Ec_Key, "Tx2_data", & DITED_PUBKEY);
// Output hash (assuming that hash () is implemented)
Uint256 Output1_Hash;
Uint256 Output2_Hash;
// ...
If (! hash (output1_hash)) {
Printf ("Generation error of Hashes Output TX 1 \ n");
Return -1; // Errors management
}
If (! hash (output2_hash)) {
Printf ("Generation error of Hashes Output TX 2 \ n");
Return -1; // Errors management
}
}
In this example,Ec_derive` is used to derive the public key of the private key of the second parts (which has been compromised). The resulting public key is then used to sign TX 2.
Conclusion
In conclusion, non -canonical signature errors cannot occur during the execution of certain types of bitcoin transactions. By understanding how the NCD works and how it differs between two transactions with different output values, we can better appreciate the importance of safe derivation patterns such as ECDSA with SHA-256. To mitigate thesis problems, developers should guarantee that their implementation correctly manages NCD errors and guarantees that all public keys are valid before signing transactions.
Advice
To prevent similar problems in your projects:
1.